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This article considers the challenges faced by digital evidence specialists when 
collaborating with other specialists and agencies in other jurisdictions when investigating 
cyber crime. The opportunities, operational environment and modus operandi of a cyber 
criminal are considered, with a view to developing the skills and procedural support that 
investigators might usefully consider in order to respond more effectively to the 
investigation of cyber crimes across State boundaries. Carrying out blackmail by using a 
computer, for example, is a particularly popular category of computer crime which 
involves the coordination of law enforcement and investigatory groups on an 
international level. A representative case was that involving three Russian individuals 
who extorted up to 4 million US dollars from United Kingdom based on-line casinos and 
bookmakers.1 The criminals were taken into custody in September 2004 following the 
successful joint efforts of the National High Tech Crime Unit in the UK, Interpol, the 
FBI, Russia’s Interior Ministry and the Prosecutor General’s office. The authors propose 
in this article that the Electronic Discovery Reference Model (EDRM), which is a useful 
framework for systemic thinking, can used to support the need for collaboration during 
the investigation process. 
Introduction [Heading type A] 
Historically, an investigation was in principle a self contained, self-controlled, self-
centered, solitary activity. Typically, communications of findings were limited to internal 
(local) members from the same team, each member familiar with the terminology and 
vocabulary. Lack of scientific procedures in criminal investigations in the early years 
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dictated such an approach.2 However, advances in science such as fingerprinting, blood 
analysis and trace evidence resulted in increasing numbers of specialists becoming 
involved in crime scene investigations, in turn increasing the complexity and size of the 
communication channels. The advances in, pervasiveness and ubiquitous nature of, 
information technologies3 and in turn the global nature of cybercrimes, have increased 
the need for investigators to engage in complex inter-group communication on a 
multinational basis as they investigate criminal acts using interconnected technologies. 
Furthermore, the different judicial systems throughout the world create a challenging 
environment for the investigators of cybercrimes. Whilst criminals use information 
technologies as they see fit across national boundaries, it is no longer possible for 
investigators to operate individually. It is now necessary to collaborate across State 
boundaries, which makes the cybercrime scene a greater challenge for any investigator 
and a more pertinent area for research than before.4 
The main aim of this article is to highlight some of the issues involved in investigating 
cybercrimes across State boundaries and the need to collaborate on the particular problem 
of determining the scope of inquiry, and what can or cannot be investigated in connection 
with the crime scene. Within this context, it is relevant to explore the following issues: 
a. How to incorporate important elements in the investigatory practice to deal with 
the complexity of investigations across jurisdictions. 
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b. How to decide where relevant data or evidence in relation to an investigation is 
located and how it is recovered. 
c. Establishing who is or ought to be involved in determining the scope of the 
investigation. 
d. How investigators collaborate with each other and other relevant agencies to 
provide for a common understanding of the problems, and the use of a language 
that is clear to all parties. 
e. The logistics and complexity of negotiating the collection of digital data when 
investigating a cybercrime. 
The main concern is not on the management of data or information, but on how digital 
data is judged to be of relevance, and how this is communicated to other jurisdictions 
when investigating a cybercrime. 
Identifying the need for collaborative enquiry and communication [Heading type A] 
As with many traditional crime scene investigations, a cybercrime investigation may need 
to investigate hardware, software or storage (whether physical devices or virtual areas) 
that contain private data. Whether an investigator has the authority to investigate private 
data will depend on the nature of the crime and the substantive and procedural laws of the 
jurisdiction in which the investigation takes place. 
It has been recognized that existing procedures and practices in forensic investigations 
are in need of further development when investigating on-line fraud and cybercrime in 
general.5 The take-up of digital technology has changed the landscape of the crime scene, 
increasing the need for cross-jurisdiction investigation and collaboration, and the use of 
sound forensic practices and procedures. It may be that the procedures and techniques 
used in a digital crime investigation are so flawed that that will be excluded from legal 
proceedings. 
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There has been considerable discussion regarding the definition of the crime scene and, 
more recently, the cybercrime scene - see for example the distinction between ‘live 
versus dead systems’6 from which the problem of defining the actual cyber crime scene 
boundaries becomes evident. The blurring of distinctive boundaries containing the 
cybercrime scene occurs due to the ubiquitous nature of digital media, the investigator’s 
experience and skills needed to manipulate the data, together with the context and type of 
the respective crime. Changes in society, technology and behaviour have influenced the 
environment and opportunity for crime and therefore the extent of the crime scene. 
Furthermore, these changes also serve to extend the skills that the investigation of 
cybercrime requires. Despite the significant progress in teamwork between different 
agencies, existing research does not address the complexity of the problem.7 A central 
challenge in the support for and coordination of forensic investigators is to enable them to 
work together, as a team, for a common purpose. 
Cybercrime scene investigation [Heading] 
Cyber crimes are not new, as illustrated in:8 
‘cyber-crimes are not necessarily new crimes; many cases involve rather classic 
types of crimes where criminals exploit computing power and accessibility to 
information. However, it seems that the anonymity provided through the Internet 
encourages crimes that involve the use of computer systems, since criminals 
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believe that there is a small chance of being prosecuted, let alone being caught for 
their actions.’ 
This is further supported by researchers from a variety of disciplines, as well as lawyers. 
Professor Noel Cox suggests that cybercrime is by nature a cross border crime,9 and 
Professor Marjie T. Britz comments that ‘for the first time, criminals can cross 
international boundaries without the use of passports or official documentation’.10 Cyber 
crime has long been recognized as being transnational by nature, and attempts have been 
made to provide for an international framework.11 It follows that there is a need for 
operational co-ordination and collaboration across state boundaries by investigating 
authorities. 
While an experienced forensic investigator would recognize best practices in dealing with 
a crime scene in the physical world, setting boundaries and selecting what is relevant in 
such an abstract and intangible cyber environment is in its infancy.12 This is not only a 
technical problem, but also a significant socio-cultural and collaborative problem that 
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becomes even more complex due to its trans-national nature.13 Digital forensics is 
concerned with the investigation, analysis, preservation and presentation of digital 
evidence as part of the judicial process.14 However, because of the complexity of 
technical architectures and the approach to information systems security to promote 
business continuity, and recovery to mitigate the effects of unauthorized intrusion, the 
investigation process becomes even more complex.15 The opportunities for criminals to 
use digital means for their modus operandi are legion, and the criminal imagination is 
offered considerable possibilities when taking into account the combination of 
availability, simplicity of use, mobility, high performance, affordable technology, and the 
lack of user awareness to protect their systems. 
The characteristics of crime scene investigations have evolved over the last few decades 
such that the skills and attributes also need to be reconsidered. It is suggested that those 
involved in digital forensic investigations will need to have a holistic view and 
knowledge of their domain from five perspectives: technical (what is possible); 
professional (what is permissible); practice (what is appropriate); ethical (what is morally 
right) and legal. Technical expertise is concerned with understanding digital information 
and communication technologies. More precisely, the range of knowledge should, for 
example, include any or all of the following aspects: data storage, data representation, 
data communication, computer processes, operating systems, access controls, security, 
the internet, protocols, client and server programming. The plethora of technologies 
means there is a need for suitable expertise which cannot be expected to be found in a 
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single investigator. This is reflected, for example, in the ACPO guidelines16 and more 
specifically with the second Principle, which provides that obtaining access to the 
original data should only be performed by a person competent in the specific underlying 
domain. In summary these guidelines encompass the following: ethics and its relation to 
the law and computing, legal processes, digital evidence and includes a regulatory 
framework for digital investigation. Although there are series of guidelines17 and 
Standard Operating Procedures18 that are widely available, these are not sufficient if they 
are performed by a person that is not competent in the respective subject.  
In practice, technical and professional strands can merge, depending on the nature of the 
investigation, and may be conducted in an individual suspect’s home, a corporate site and 
across international boundaries. Additionally where it is thought that incidents occurred 
in a commercial environment, forensics investigators will need to take into account 
business considerations such as business continuity plans, disaster recovery plans and 
information security plans. This is because such considerations might provide the 
technical evidence to support the investigation, and avoid creating a disaster through the 
intervention of the investigation. Successful investigations are possible where appropriate 
collaborative communication has been adopted in conjunction with some or all of the 
following: the use of appropriate tools for the investigation, compatible working practices 
when handling evidence, and a forensic approach to the detection, preservation, analysis 
and presentation of evidence. What is appropriate in any one situation does not only 
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depend on the particular problem and technology, but also on socio-cultural contexts and 
the legal framework. These issues are clearly also dependent on complex national and 
international contexts, including the way legislation is interpreted, applied and acted 
upon, which differs between States. Historically, specifically formed groups and 
organizations of experts and, occasionally, a task force would often target international 
organized crime, terrorist activities and other high profile crimes. This may have been 
successful where there were relatively small numbers of people that could be targeted 
with the use of exceptional resources. The problem with cybercrime is that it is 
something that is not limited to a (relatively small number) of organized gangs or 
international criminals or terrorist groups. The point is that because of the success of ICT 
related technology, more or less any existing crime can in one way or other ‘become’ 
transformed or extended into a cybercrime. In addition, new activities occur that are 
difficult to classify or are not catered for in existing legal frameworks. 
It is possible to suggest that cybercrime is now the ‘everyday’ crime of the new era. It is 
no longer the preserve of specialist groups of experts who should be responsible for 
investigating cybercrime, but local investigators in collaboration with local investigators 
in a different country. This leads to the conclusion that forensic investigators face a 
significantly more complex task when investigating cybercrime and crimes involving 
digital technology, in comparison with a traditional crime scene. Thus the need for 
collaboration and communication between different specialist individuals and teams on a 
national and international level is often unavoidable. Additional challenges arise because 
a cybercrime scene tends to transcend national boundaries and legal jurisdictions. With 
this in mind, an overview of a possible framework to facilitate a complex inquiry with the 
intent to encourage collaborative working amongst members of investigatory teams and 
between investigatory teams is discussed below. 
A case for strategic systemic thinking [Heading] 
Mulholland suggests that ‘…there are no quick fixes. To solve the problem of online 
fraud or at least bring it down to a manageable level requires a multi-facetted approach 
by all the stakeholders involved’.19 The framework for Strategic Systemic Thinking 
(SST) described in this section, supports the involvement of all those participating in an 
investigation. The SST framework was developed to help organizations to formulate 
appropriate processes to investigate effectively, and to provide support for an inquiry. It 
was developed specifically to help teams of users to analyze complex problems. It is for 
this reason that the SST framework is, arguably, suitable for use with cyber crime scene 
investigations. Earlier work by two of the authors with the cyber crimes in mind shows 
some promise.20 
The SST framework involves three aspects, which are not sequential and may be applied 
in any order. It is intended to be repeatable, and it is possible to move from one analysis 
to another repeatedly and in any direction, at any time. A theory of the case can be 
established, which can be adapted as more information is obtained, analyzed and 
assessed. 
The strategy adopted by an investigator will be dependent upon the organizational 
culture, which influences the amount of autonomy an investigator is permitted. It is an 
essential characteristic of the SST framework that the investigators control the 
investigation. A team of investigators may comprise of specialists, and one or more 
external facilitators (experienced in systemic methods for inquiry) who provide support 
and guidance. The framework supports the investigation of complex problems. With the 
support of the framework, each investigator can explore their perspective on the theory of 
the case. The outside individuals are present to act as the central coordinator to discuss 
the various individual theories. The aim is to bring thoughts about the case together to 
enable the investigation to proceed, having taken into account different opinions. 
Investigators can use a range of methods, which are well known in the disciplines of 
Information Systems (IS) and organizational studies, for instance. In order to deal with 
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complex and uncertain problems, systems analysts have used methods and techniques 
such as Brainstorming, Mind-Maps and Effective Rich Pictures. These techniques have 
been successfully used as part of IS methodologies such as Soft Systems Methodology, 
SSM,21 Effective Technical and Human Implementation of Computer Supported 
Systems, ETHICS22 and Client-Led Design.23 These methods have been used for years to 
assist people in making sense of complex problems. The various techniques and tools 
have different approaches to analysis. McFazdean has defined brainstorming as follows:24 
‘Brainstorming relies on the absence of evaluations in the ideas phase. Moreover, 
free-wheeling is encouraged so that an extensive list of ideas can be generated. 
The group members must be allowed to communicate an idea, however mundane, 
strange or wild, to the rest of the group. An idea that may seem impractical may 
contain a germ of a great solution.’ 
A brainstorming session will produce an unstructured collection of (lists of) ideas and 
concepts relating to a problem. 
Mind Mapping has a long history (it is thought that Porphyry of Tyros from the third 
century CE used a form of mind-mapping). More recently, however the semantic network 
theory of human understanding (associated with Allan M. Collins and M. Ross Quillan)25 
included a development of Mind Mapping as an explicit technique. Mind Mapping has 
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been described as ‘a powerful technique which provides a universal key to unlocking the 
potential of the brain’.26 Mind maps are recognizable by their depiction of relationships 
between ideas and concepts, often radiating from a central concept and gathering details 
and associations along ‘branches’. Analysts are able to identify and describe relationships 
and associations in the form of a Mind Map. Rich Pictures is a technique that is favoured 
by many systems analysts, especially those using SSM.27 One of the benefits of this 
technique is to enable the user to take a more holistic view of a problem. Another benefit 
is that it promotes the elaboration and exploration of meanings between relations and 
associations of a complex problem.28 Rich Pictures can be described as ‘pictorial, 
cartoon-like representations of the problem situation that highlight the significant and 
contentious aspects in a manner most likely to lead to original thinking…’29 These 
techniques aim to bring about a constructive dialogue between the investigators and 
teams involved in the investigation. 
Aspects of the SST framework [Heading] 
Intra-analysis is a phrase used to describe the ability of investigators to have their own 
perspective on the theory of the case. Inter-analysis is the part of the inquiry where 
alternatives are discussed collectively. The third aspect of the framework comprises the 
evaluation. The evaluation represents an examination of what is assumed to be known, 
that is, the results of analysis. 
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One significant aspect of the SST framework is its capability to incorporate a number of 
different conclusions, which is particularly useful, because digital forensics requires the 
investigator to consider that there may be more than one conclusion to any given set of 
facts. Forensic investigations are required to incorporate the ability to deal with issues 
such as fuzziness of inclusion, for example. That is, being able to identify which digital 
data would be part of the digital evidence, proving or refuting a user’s actions or 
intentions. In dealing with complex cyber crime investigations, it is conceivable that the 
investigators will explore uncertainty in the following way: 
a. unstructured uncertainty: the assumption of not having enough information to 
commit to a decision; 
b. structured uncertainty: the assumption of too much information, conflicting 
information, ambiguities, paradox (can be true and false at the same time). 
Not only can an investigator never know for sure whether what she or he investigates is 
the right thing to investigate, but also the scope of investigation is uncertain. This, among 
other reasons, is one reason why it is not appropriate to use bi-valued logic, and in 
practice it is not applied in investigations. While this might appear to be obvious from an 
abstract generic point of view, the problem becomes significant when logically rational 
work processes and supporting IT solutions are developed. The more complex and 
uncertain any one problem becomes, the more people tend to apply (‘scientific’) 
reductionist techniques and models focusing on the rigour of analysis. This behavioural 
pattern leads people to unwittingly undermine their own human ability to deal with 
uncertainty and paradoxes when dealing with complex problems. So when processes and 
mechanisms are developed to support such an investigation process, they tend to omit 
obvious human activity and reasoning that is contextually necessary. Ironically, if 
implemented and used as intended, because of the nature of such support systems, they 
would tend to undermine efforts to focus on questions related to individual judgment and 
understanding of the relevance of the problem. Elements of the SST Framework have 
been designed to accommodate four possible logical possibilities, and it is argued that 
this framework is a good candidate for addressing the requirements of digital forensics 
investigations. 
Conclusions [Heading] 
Cyber crime investigations can benefit from more advanced methods of thinking about 
how to investigate a complex cyber crime. An experienced forensic analyst aims to place 
any investigation into context for the purpose of transforming information from 
unstructured to structured uncertainty. Any approach that is aimed at supporting 
investigators to make decisions and to communicate with each other must be able to 
incorporate a number of different people with different worldviews, languages and 
cultures. But this is not enough; an approach must do more than support interaction, it 
must also enable individuals to embrace uncertainties in their everyday life as 
investigators. It is suggested that the SST framework is a worth while contender to be 
developed and applied for the purpose of supporting complex cyber crime investigations. 
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